I. Introduction
In
this paper, I contend that we do not have any reason to trust in our moral
intuitions on the grounds that moral intuitions are epistemically unreliable, suffer
from persistent disagreement, and are subject to debate regarding its
objectivity.
To
limit the scope of our discussion, I will be focusing on a foundationalist interpretation
of intuition as a means of knowledge production.[1] As
such, an intuition shall thereby be defined as a self-evident “intellectual
seeming”.[2]
Consequently, moral intuitionism would entail a non-natural, realist stance on
the objectivity of morality, and would be the utilization of intuition as an
epistemic tool concerning moral matters; i.e., what is right and what is wrong.[3]
II.
Argument from
Unreliability
As
opposed to perception, intuition is notoriously unreliable. While not
infallible, perceptual seemings (i.e., the visual analog of intellectual
seemings) are typically considered reliable because they detect potential
inaccuracies vis-à-vis
context. In other words, when weather phenomena obscures vision or when physically
impaired, we are less apt to trust our perceptual seemings.[4]
Intellectual seemings, on the other hand, lack the capacity to receive reliable
feedback contextually.[5]
Additionally,
the non-naturalness of moral intuition implies that they are causally inert, i.e.,
they can neither affect nor be affected by other objects. That is to say, moral
intuitions cannot be caused by their corresponding moral truths.[6]
Moral
intuitions are also subject to various distorting factors.
First,
phraseology. Studies have concluded that when the trolley problem was presented
with “saving language”, people overwhelmingly choose to flip the switch; the
opposite occurred when “killing language” was employed.[7]
Second,
partiality. One might have ulterior motives for experiencing certain intuitions.[8]
For example, in judging two piano performances, the father of one of the
contestants would, intuitively, think that his daughter played better, though
this might not be justified without familial association.[9]
Third,
disgust. Disgust elicited by physical or chemical stimuli and disgust regarding
some moral prospects, respectively, have been shown to influence the moral intuitive
process.[10]
Moreover,
other factors also influence intuition. These include the ordering of cases involving
intuition, hunger level of intuitive moral agents, and the “Knobe effect,” i.e.,
the tendency for people to judge intentional actions as negative rather than
positive.[11]
An
argument which has been proposed by Jonathan Smith states that partiality is
imprecise. Concerning the example mentioned previously, Smith argues that a piano
performance is incomparable with moral intuition. There are nuances and
particularities present in musical performances which are not present in the
fundamental claims of basic moral intuitions (e.g., murder is bad). He presents
a counterexample: two contestants play a single note and are judged based on
proximity with a third note. Thereby, if the father judges that the note his
daughters played was closer, then he would be justified in believing that his
daughter won, regardless of his familial predisposition towards her.[12]
Though
I agree that the father would be justified in the second instance, this
argument assumes a moral realist conclusion. A better reformulation of the piano
competition would be one in which the two contestants are simply told to simply
play one note. The father is then asked simply, “Who played better?” By
eliminating the intended note (or, when
applied to the topic of moral intuitionism, some accepted
moral principle), partiality comes back into play.
Considering
another possibility, Dario Cecchini suggests that the strength of intuition may
be a method of tracking the potential reliability of intuition in a
context-sensitive way. This would only be the case if one truly accepts moral intuitions
proportional to confidence in said intuitions, and that such confidence is
epistemically reliable.[13]
One’s confidence would then accordingly be used to determine the presence of
biases, and as such, eliminating the possibility of distorted intuitions.
Nonetheless,
there are inconsistencies in this argument. The idea that intuitive strength is
epistemically reliability remains hotly contested, as it currently lacks sufficient
empirical study.[14]
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that one would be able to prove the epistemic
reliability of moral intuitions, given that intuitive strength itself is
subject to distorting factors such as the Dunning-Kruger effect or the
“consensuality principle”.[15] Such
an argument is also subject to the implication that self-evidence is strength
dependent, which undermines the very definition of the term itself.
III.
Argument from
Disagreement
One
might assume that since moral intuition is “self-evident” and “non-inferential,”
that there would be harmony between proponents of moral ideas. Yet, this is not
the case. When ten diverse societies were examined for their views regarding moral
principles, each “exhibited substantial variation not only in the degree to
which such [moral] factors were viewed as excusing, but also in the kinds of [moral]
factors taken to provide exculpatory excuses, and in the types of norm
violations for which such [moral] factors were seen as relevant.”[16]
If the moral intuitions of two unprejudiced individuals persistently disagree on
some moral issue, then the realist basis for intuitionism would be compromised.[17]
In
addition, what seems “moral” to us may be evolutionarily favored biological
responses that have emerged over time. We have evolved to react to different
moral acts with either approval or disapproval based on biological necessity, preventing
us from attaining positive knowledge of moral predicates.[18]
Differences in moral beliefs have also been observed across ages and between
modern and traditional culture groups.[19] One
especially notable example of moral disagreement is the disagreement between
moral collectivists and individualists, as many common moral realist objections
directed towards the idea that their disagreements will not remain persistent, have
been disproven.[20]
Some
proponents of moral intuitionism argue that ostensibly moral disagreements are,
in fact, caused by morally irrelevant factors such as disagreement over related
empirical facts or the strength of certain moral reasoning. Let us consider whether
it is morally acceptable to boil a lobster alive. While it is prima facie a
moral problem, it can be reformulated into an empirical question regarding
whether the lobster experiences pain. That is, if the lobster did not
experience pain, then we would have less pretension against boiling said
lobster.[21]
Nevertheless,
this is a shallow argument, as non-moral disagreements are not the true point
of contention in a moral issue. In comparison with the previous example, we
would certainly object if a living person were to be boiled, even without
experiencing pain. The question again returns to a moral one: Are the lives of
a lobster and a person worth the same? If one continues to argue that “worth”
could be determined via some empirical measure, e.g., brain capacity, then a
new moral issue emerges: is it morally acceptable to boil some organism simply based
on the metric of brain capacity? This line of argument suggests the infinite
regressive loop fallacy.
Russ
Shafer-Landau proposes that the argument from moral disagreement is self-defeating.
He summarizes said argument in terms of moral realism, a key property of
intuitionism:
P1:
Moral realism is subject to persistent disagreement;
P2:
Any theory(s) subject to persistent disagreement is false;
C:
Therefore, moral realism is false.[22]
To
this, he claims that the same argument could be applied in reverse.
Substituting “moral realism” for “theories against moral realism” results in
the conclusion that theories against moral realism are false.
As we
will see, though Shafer-Landau’s argument is valid, it is not sound. Concealed
by Shafer-Landau’s summary of the argument from disagreement is what I will
term the agreement premise. The premise states that if moral realism is
true, then there would be widespread agreement regarding moral realism.
P1:
The agreement premise is true;
P2:
Moral realism is subject to persistent disagreement;
P3:
Any theory(s) subject to persistent disagreement is false;
C:
Therefore, either (a) moral intuitionism is false, or (b) the agreement premise
is false.
Accepting
either (a) or (b) would be difficult for the moral realist. Conversely,
if one were to now substitute “moral realism” for “theories against moral realism,”
then (b) would be acceptable to opponents of moral realism, as it implies that only
some would agree with moral realism, perfectly. In other words, Shafer-Landau’s
argument, though compelling, is more so vis-à-vis the moral realist.
IV.
Argument from Queerness
Moral
Intuitionism is a theory that is built upon a foundation of self-evident,
non-inferential moral objectivity. However, the very existence of such values
can be challenged. In J. L. Mackie’s
Argument from Queerness, Mackie reasons such that if objective values were to
exist, then objectively good values would have an inherent “to-be-pursuedness,”
and objectively bad values would have an inherent “not-to-be-pursuedness”.[23]
This motivational property is one that is unique to objective moral
values, and one which cannot be described in naturalistic terms; in other
words, objective values are “queer.”[24] To
claim that such a property is not queer is to invite contradiction with the non-natural
property of moral intuitions.[25]
The argument can be represented in both metaphysical and epistemological
versions, however, only the epistemological is necessary here:
P1:
If objective moral values exist, they will have to be epistemologically queer,
and require unconventional, bizarre epistemological faculties;
P2: We are unable to utilize such bizarre epistemological
faculties;
C: We should not believe that objective moral values exist.[26]
The
parity argument, proposed by Terence Cuneo, attempts to prove the existence of
objective values. His argument has two main premises: the parity premise (PP) and the epistemological
realism premise (PE). The
parity premise states that moral facts and epistemic facts are analogous to one
another since both are categorical imperatives, i.e., both tell us what we
ought to do and believe regardless of our subjective desires. The epistemic
realism premise describes the idea that belief in the existence of epistemic
facts seems natural; otherwise, one could theoretically have misconstrued
beliefs based only on whims and compulsions.[27]
His argument is outlined as the following, with an extra “modus tollens” (PMT)
premise added for clarity:
PP: There can be
no epistemic facts if there are no moral facts;
PE:
There are epistemic facts;
PMT: If there are epistemic facts, then
there are moral facts;
C:
If there are moral facts, then moral realism is true.[28]
Believing
in moral realism, by definition, entails believing in objective moral values,
and in this case, moral intuitionism.
Regardless,
though the argument is valid, the parity premise lacks argumentative power. As
Richard Joyce notes, there are many ways in which moral facts and epistemic
facts are incompatible. Examples include how unlike with moral facts:
- We
acquire epistemic facts involuntarily.
- Epistemological
facts lack the concept of desert, i.e., “deserved reward or punishment”.[29]
- We are not reluctant to rely on
the judgement of experts when faced with epistemological facts.[30]
As
a result of these discrepancies, we can safely disregard the parity argument
and regard the argument unsound.
Hallvard Lillehammer
expresses another objection, claiming that knowledge of objective moral values does
not entail the utilization of epistemologically
queer faculties.[31]
He argues that moral facts can be equated with logical facts, since both are causally
inert.[32] Hence,
as Lillehammer points out, if logical facts rely only on an “unproblematic sense
… which we are able to grasp” and not some bizarre epistemological faculty, then the same should be the case for
moral facts. If one were to deny this argument, the implication would be that
we are unable to access logical facts, a highly contentious and
counterintuitive claim.[33]
Whilst claiming that logical facts are
epistemologically inaccessible is certainly absurd, we can nonetheless dispute
the notion that logical facts and moral facts are analogous. One key disanalogy
between the two lies in that logical facts lack the “to-be-pursuedness” of
moral facts. For example, while the moral fact “giving to charity is good” carries
an inherent tendency to act, a tautology such as “all humans are mammals” does
not.[34]
V.
Conclusion
I
have presented three arguments against moral intuitionism in this paper, including
how:
1. Moral intuitions are fallible.
2. There are disagreements between
supposedly “self-evident” moral intuitions.
3. The objective nature of moral intuitions
can be challenged.
Thus,
I reject the notion that we have any good reasons to trust our moral intuition.
Endnotes
[1] Britannica,
“Intuition.”
[2] Audi, “Self-Evidence”; Bealer, “Intuition and the Autonomy
of Philosophy,” 10; Chudnoff, Intuition; Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism,
102; Ogar, Anyim, and Ogar, “A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism as the
Foundation of Knowledge,” 1.
[3] “Moral Philosophy”; Stratton-Lake,
“Intuitionism in Ethics.”
[4] Cecchini, “The Reliability Challenge to Moral Intuitions,”
8.
[5] DeStefano, “The
Reliability and Nature of Philosophical Intuitions,” 17–18.
[6] Hayward,
“Immoral Realism,” 1; Stratton-Lake, “Intuitionism in Ethics.”
[7] Bengson,
“Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers,” 6.
[8] Sinnott-Armstrong, “Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical
Psychology,” 343–46.
[9] Sinnott-Armstrong,
343.
[10] Tao et al.,
“Effects of Core Disgust and Moral Disgust on Moral Judgment,” 8.
[11] Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg, “The Instability of
Philosophical Intuitions”; Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous
Factors in Judicial Decisions,” 6890; Zucchelli et al., “Intentionality
Attribution and Emotion,” 1.
[12] Smith, “On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case Against Moral
Intuitionism,” 77.
[13] Cecchini, “The Reliability Challenge to Moral Intuitions,”
11.
[14] Cecchini, 22.
[15] Cecchini,
23–24; Dunning, “The Dunning-Kruger Effect,” 259–62; Koriat, “The
Self-Consistency Model of Subjective Confidence.”
[16] “Small-Scale Societies Exhibit Fundamental Variation in the
Role of Intentions in Moral Judgment,” 4692.
[17] Sidgwick, The
Methods of Ethics, 208–10; Shafer-Landau, Whatever Happened to Good and
Evil?, 44.
[18] Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” 348; Street, “A Darwinian
Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” 120; Joyce, The Evolution of
Morality, 72; Morton, “A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral
Realism.”
[19] Nisan, “Moral
Norms and Social Conventions.”
[20] Goldman, “The
Right Argument from Moral Disagreement,” 855–64.
[21] Stratton-Lake, “Intuitionism in Ethics.”
[22] Shafer-Landau, Whatever
Happened to Good and Evil?, 44–48.
[23] Mackie, Ethics:
Inventing Right and Wrong, 40; Olson, Moral Error Theory, 104.
[24] Scholl, “A
Defense of Mackie’s Moral Error Theory,” 2–3; Mackie, Ethics: Inventing
Right and Wrong, 33.
[25] Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 41.
[26] Mackie, 38–41; Lillehammer, “The Argument from Queerness,”
1–2.
[27] Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism,
52–62.
[28] “On Cuneo’s Defence of The Parity Premise,” 1; Cuneo, The
Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, 6.
[29] “Desert.”
[30] The Evolution of Morality, 14–16.
[31] Lillehammer,
“The Argument from Queerness,” 6.
[32] Balaguer,
“Platonism in Metaphysics.”
[33] Lillehammer,
“The Argument from Queerness,” 6.
[34] The Editors of
Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Tautology.”
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